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Military

Overview
The Role of Joint Experimentation
Military transformation-"a process that shapes the changby Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr ing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizaIt seems impossible these days to pick up a military affairs tions"-is on the minds and agendas of everyone dealing with the journal or periodical without running into a discussion regarding military. Many people talk about transformation; the two authors something called transformation, often in association with a joint of this Defense Horizons have done something about it. In fact, experimentation program. A sound joint experimentation program they are among the few who have been responsible for shaping plays a crucial role in making genuine progress toward the goal and implementing the concept. To get a better idea of what goes of force transformation. A clear understanding of the scope and into this process, particularly the element of joint experimentaconcept of transformation and joint experimentation is essential to tion that is helping to identify and define the nature of change, useful discourse. However, much of what appears in print confuses Defense Horizons presents the views of two of America's leading rather than clarifies the issue. Before we can discuss the role of a military officers who have been involved in the process. joint experimentation program in military transformation, we need Admiral Harold Gehman, the last commander of Atlantic to agree on what transformation is. Once the meaning of the term has Command (before it became Joint Forces Command, or JFCOM) been settled, means must be devised to measure the effectiveness of and initiator of the Joint Experimentation Directorate, presents a joint experimentation program in contributing to transformation. a framework for how experimentation can advance the goals of transformation and clarifies terms and relates them to the tasks Transformation Defined at hand. He also considers the role of the joint experimentation While numerous definitions of transformation have been process, uses historical analogies to identify the prerequisites for advanced, with dozens in use within the Department of Defense successful transformation, and gives examples of where earlier (DOD) alone, we will use the authoritative definition given in DOD attempts have failed and why. Finally, he shows how joint experiplanning guidance: "a process that shapes the changing nature of mentation can help achieve success in our current efforts by minimilitary competition and cooperation through new combinations mizing conditions that have brought about failure in the past.
of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our Moving from the theoretical basis established by Admiral nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabiliGehman to practice, Major General James Dubik, Director of ties to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace the JFCOM Joint Experimentation Directorate, describes how and stability in the world." the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Parsing this definition, we find some phrases worth noting: is an important catalyst for transforming military capability. He * a process. That is good. Every speaker at every transformadescribes the "two-path strategy to innovation" being employed, tion conference in the last 3 years has said transformation is a j ourinvolving Joint Prototypes and Joint Concepts and actionable ney, not a destination. Arbitrarily declaring where transformation recommendations. He leads the reader through how this process is taking us would seem inconsistent with this agreed understandis working today to achieve transformation.
ing of the process. fires, close air support, finding and striking critical mobile targets, skills, and new organizational structures. These four areas seem theater ballistic missile defense, and opposed assault to seize forbroad enough, and metrics can be set for these categories, ward operating bases are so heavily dependent on the coordinated 0 exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our and integrated activities of more than two services that the joint asymmetric vulnerabilities. This seems rather limiting. It does not imperatives can be said to outweigh the service imperatives. These include, for example, noncontinuous change characterized by a are joint operations. Others, such as measures to prevent fratricide, dramatic "leap ahead." One suspects the authors did not intend to combat ID, and combat search and rescue, can be added to the list. exclude discontinuous change and leap-ahead advances; it is safe For the purposes of this discussion, we can accept that joint to assume that breakthrough advances are always welcome.
refers not only to operations involving two or more services, but also 0 to sustain our strategic position. This is clear but, again, to military activities that are uniquely joint. Just as services have rather limited, experimentation and transformation imperatives, so should the A program of transformation, then, is a process, without a prejoint world. Just as there are joint forces and joint operations, there determined outcome, that involves new concepts, capabilities, and should be joint experimentation. organizations, and skilled people to handle them. Further, we are engaged in this process to ensure that our current military advanExperimentation tages do not erode and to find ways to protect ourselves from new What exactly is an experiment, and how does it differ from and emerging asymmetric threats.
the training, exercising, testing, and demonstrating that the Armed There is nothing mysterious about this. The reason DOD has Forces do every day? When JFCOM initiated the joint experiment established an office and an official program to pursue transformaprogram in 1999, this dictionary definition of experiment was used: tion may be the belief that business as usual would not achieve the "a test, trial, or tentative procedure; an act or operation for the desired result. Neither would a personality-driven process in which purpose of discovering something unknown or of testing a principle the most influential member says: "This is where we are going; follow or supposition." An experiment, therefore, is not training, not a me." That approach lacks intellectual and factual underpinning. A demonstration, not a proof of concept, and not a final test of some more useful transformation process is one that relies on a methodidevelopmental product. One experiments to discover and learn and cal and scientific program of experimentation. An organization now to test a supposition or hypothesis. exists for that purpose.
In the scientific sense, an experiment and its results must be repeatable to have any validity. The same applies to our task as Joint Experimentation Defined well, since transformation demands we give up something known for In 1999, responding to the urging of several members of the something that merely promises more. Yet we must be sure our innoSenate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense crevation works in all expected conditions before we give up our present ated the joint experimentation program and tasked U.S. Joint Forces capability, and repetition is not likely to receive support. Command (JFCOM) to be the DOD executive agent. The JFCOM Unfortunately, while the dictionary definition of experimentacharter was framed in a single, half-page letter. Some amount of tion fits nicely with the military task of transformation, it does not deduction as to the extent of the task and mission was required, and lend itself well to the DOD budgeting and programming system, JFCOM took a while to make a good start.
since that system wants to know what we are getting for the money The pros and cons ofjointness have been argued long and hard, we spend. To say we are going to spend X millions of dollars to but jointness is at the core of transformation via joint experimentadiscover something unknown is not well received by the budgetary tion. While not wTitten anywhere, it is common and even popular system. Early in the DOD joint experimentation program, there was among some senior service leaders to definejoint as the blending or strong pressure for short-term results. Such pressure is inconsistent weaving together of service capabilities, requirements, and doctrine, with a program of experimentation. The Role of Joint Experimentation eral George Custer, who reportedly left his new Gatling Guns behind during the Indian Campaign, and Admiral Jackie Fisher, who revoluTaking advantage of the temporary lack of a global peer comtionized the Royal Navy's dreadnoughts by making them lighter and petitor to transform our military for future challenges is a logical faster-though the Royal Navy at the Battle of Jutland fared somewhat and achievable goal. Doing so by a methodical and scientific process better than Custer when it lined the fast, lightly armored dreadnoughts up helps fend off the favorite projects of influential people and ensures with the slow, heavily armored dreadnoughts of the Kaiser.
as broad a range of possibilities as is practicable. The best course of History also teaches us that, in most cases, while the transformaaction is a systematic program that looks at all possible options to tion may be completely successful, "the system" will not accept the meet the two guidance conditions (maximize present advantage and new concept, capabilities, or organization until needed in crisis. Long prepare for the future) presents unbiased options with data, studies, before December 7, 1941, the U.S. Navy had demonstrated that carrianalysis, and ranges of variability and uncertainty, and makes recomers and carrier aviation could strike both land bases and ships, yet the mendations for further studies. Just as the services have requirebattleship was still the capital ship of the Navy and the centerpiece of ments to meet future challenges, so, too, does the joint community. both doctrine and operational plans. Similarly, the principle of radar
In fact, the joint community's military challenges are more complex had been demonstrated in the 1930s, but it was not exploited, than any single service's. Because our doctrine states unequivocally Unfortunately, one cannot be certain in advance which new that we are going to conduct operations of the future in a joint manconcept, capability, or organization will be needed. All too frequently, ner, the transformational challenges in the joint environment are the measure of successful transformation has been the ability to significant. In fact, the problem is essentially unbounded. reach down and bring up some new capability in an emergency to It has been said that battle is the most arduous of all man's save the day. This line of thought argues against meeting deadlines
activities. An individual battle has hundreds if not thousands of and producing results.
variables. How, then, to conduct an experiment with hundreds if not With history as our guide, what should we be transforming today?
thousands of variables? The only way is to break the activity down The answer falls into two parts: first, things we do well now but need to parts, hold as many variables constant as possible, and repeat the to do better; second, new things we cannot do now but project we will experiment many times. Due to financial constraints, this process need to do to meet future challenges.
cannot be done on a grand scale. The program, therefore, has to Improving the way we do some of the things we already do fulfills include alternatives to expensive, grand field events. Alternatives one part of OSD guidance: to "exploit our nation's advantages." It is not include human-in-the-loop simulations, computer-based simuladifficult to make a list of what these advantages are: strategic mobility, tions, and seminar war games. It would be a mistake to measure precision lethality, space-based and air-breathing intelligence gatherexperimentation progress by numbers of field events, numbers of ing, motivated and trained force, and so on. There has been much troops or aircraft involved, or days at sea. analysis already of which of these is going to be challenged by oppo-
The direction of the joint experimentation program must be nents in the future and which probably will not be challenged directly.
determined by what is learned from the experiments themselves, A program of experimentation to find ways to enhance our advantages not by predetermined concepts seeking hoped-for results. Rarely, in and diminish an opponent's capabilities can be established in a rather the real world of scientific research for answers to hard technical straightforward manner. It would be an error, however, to determine questions, does the institution start out saying it knows the answer the answer before the analysis has been done. For example, there are and needs to conduct research only to prove their correctness. A promany ways to enhance strategic mobility, and building more airplanes gram that states the answer first and then attempts to confirm it is a or shrinking 70-ton tanks down to 25 tons may not be the best answer.
program of test and evaluation, not experimentation. The process of Experimentation will yield the best answer.
experimentation, as noted above, is one of discovery. Similarly, developing a program to determine what things we do If the joint experimentation program is to include experiments not do now but must do in the future can be approached in a scienbased on one or more favorite answers to future challenges, it can do tific, methodical manner. Here again, we must be careful to avoid the so only by utilizing the second part of the definition ("testing a prinrequirement to produce results on the basis of a schedule or predeciple or supposition"). That is, it should be hypothesis-based: "If I termination. This part of transformation is more like curing cancer; can do X, then I will get the Y result I want." After the hypothesis has we have to keep working hard at it, and cannot predict when results been established, experiments are designed to determine whether will be achieved. On the contrary, demands for results according to a it is correct. Field events, which are designed to demonstrate that schedule most likely would ensure failure. a concept works, are not the same thing. Yet this is what the U.S. challenges that threaten the security of the Nation and our allies. military generally does. Conducting a demonstration to prove the Transformed U.S. forces will continue to operate from a position of value of a pet innovation is a common fault of many experimentation overmatching power, deterring conflict, dissuading adversaries, and programs, not just joint ones.
assuring others of our commitment to a peaceful world. In sum, a program of true joint experimentation is an unbiased
The Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Camprocess that fuels transformation, helps to hedge against unexpaign is an important catalyst for transforming military capability pected developments, and is the most likely way both to develop and and forms an essential part of the top 10 commanders in the field. Perhaps more important than fostering the creation of new concepts, the campaign serves as a mechanism to The U.S. military has a long tradition of transformation through align the efforts of combatant commands, services, and interagency, experimentation, from the Navy's fleet challenges in the 1930s, which multinational, and industry partners as we collectively develop capagave birth to carrier tactics, to the Army's famous Louisiana Maneubilities and concepts. Finally, the campaign helps create an overall vers of 1941, which developed the initial doctrine for combined arms culture of innovation. air-ground operations. Now, a new era of military transformation is unfolding. The end of the Cold War, which changed the international Approach to Innovation: A Two-Path Strategy security landscape, coincided with the emergence of the informaThis campaign employs a two-path strategy that results in two tion age. As new threats arose, new warfighting tools and methods distinct products. The first product consists of prototypes-improvecame to hand. These developments created both the need and the ments to near-term warfighting capabilities. The second consists of opportunity for broad transformation across all the services-for joint concepts and actionable recommendations-new approaches joint transformation.
to capabilities that focus on the next decade. As Admiral Gehman observed above, transformation is a process To improve near-term warfighting capabilities, the campaign that enables joint forces to maintain and extend overmatching combat pursues a strategy of rapid prototyping. This strategy takes new power by exploring, testing, and then establishing new combinations ideas or concepts that originate on the joint concept development of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations. Transformation path, or from real-world operations, and converts them into physical ultimately means redefining standards for military success by accomform as prototypes. These prototypes are then put into the hands of plishing military missions that were previously unimaginable or imposjoint warfighters in field exercises as quickly as possible. sible, except at prohibitive risk or cost. Military transformation is a key
The prototype path began to take shape immediately following element of American national defense strategy.
Millennium 4 As such, the JFCOM mission is to been q benaggressively partnering with regional combatant commandmaximize military capabilities by leading the transformation of joint ers to execute this directive. We have taken sufficiently completed forces, through joint concept development and experimentation, capabilities into the field to get them into the hands of the users and identifying joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training-all to support the combatant commands.
i nc ptedeieed to ake imp ovements. Concept development, a period of discovery and hypothesis A coherently joint, network-centric, distributed force capable experimentation, precedes prototyping. Concepts are generated of making immediate, superior decisions and massing effects across along the joint concept development path through a series of the battlespace is the focus of this campaign plan. Employing the wargames and experiments. In collaboration with service, combatpowerful tools of joint concept development and experimentation, ant command, joint staff, defense agency, and multinational peers, the U.S. military can address, and possibly even anticipate, the we are exploring promising new ideas and concepts. We begin to 4. Defense llorizoiis refine them through an experimentation process that begins by testeight more wargames in the coming months. Our involvement with ing hypotheses and ends with a demonstrated capability. Concepts allies and coalition partners has also expanded. We have conducted that meet specific requirements are eventually given to teams of two distributed multinational experiments with Australia, Canada, specialists who convert them to prototypes.
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Based on how these concepts perform, we make recommendaWe currently plan two more in this series to include NATO, and with tions to senior leaders that help them decide how to guide joint Poland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Korea, and Japan as observers. experimentation and invest military resources. Work performed Interagency partnership has also grown, with the Departments of on joint concept development is dedicated to making long-term State, Justice, and Treasury connected on a collaborative informaimprovements to military capability. The focus is on making the next tion environment. In addition, the Department of Commerce and the decade's improvements to joint warfighting.
Agency for International Development will be added shortly. One key benefit of expanding the experimental ground is the Expanding the Experimental Ground productive exchange of expertise and ideas among organizations that are helping develop joint and multinational concepts and capaOne of the most significant ways to improve our perspective bilities. While this expanded vision broadens the span of military in this campaign is by making every effort to expand the scope of blte.Wieti xaddvso raestesa fmltr inrthiscapantsign experis mentakiong eve eforts to pan the widscopef experts who contribute to the process, it also ensures that joint conparticipants in experimentation. This ensures that the widest array text is embedded in service and combatant command wargames and of partners is included in our activities. We call this effort to enlarge exercises. Through this expansion of the experimental ground, more the scope of our campaign "expanding the experimental ground." organizations gain access to the capabilities, tools, and informaExpanding our scope occurs as we conduct prototype experimentation necessary for exploring new and powerful military capabilities. tion in combatant command exercises, co-evolve service and and nellar-temul proatiotypanding henbartat cially valuable about the DCEE is that it both supports and links the commands, services, as well as multinatiional and interagency partwo experimental paths, joint prototype and joint concept. As such, ners, are better able to participate, particularly given JFCOM's capathe environment serves as a conduit for feeding promising capabilibilities to distribute joint experimentation activities virtually. These tie back and for between pt oment pathlan events also allow us to take more intellectual risk in a prudent way, the joint prototype path.
building a culture of innovation. Finally, these events occur at a pace In 2004, JFCOM will establish the JNTC to link previously indeconsistent with the turnover of technology, allowing us to keep at the p n seric rangesttoge the in to ttn bevused for cuttng dgeof tchnlogcal eveopmnt.pendent service ranges together in a network that can be used for cutting edge of technological development, joint training and experimentation. When completely developed, the JFCOM already has begun embedding prototype experimentaJoint National Training Capability will provide a real world laboration within joint exercises. These prototyping exercises will include 14 different exercises and span 7 combatant commands. Our contory to conduct experiments that assess new doctrine, tactics, and cepts are being developed primarily in cosponsored wargames and procedures using live military forces against professional opposing exptserebeing. developdpimrili cosponsored eventargacupmest and forces in realistic combat conditions. Lessons learned from JNTC refinement of the current Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), Joint exercises and experiments will be a principal source of insight for Operefinen Cofnthcuents JandointhOperatoions Concepatsis, Jtoint, generating new operating concepts. The JNTC represents a global Opderating concepts. (JO ) havecnduother joint o rerat , functiana, network of joint training facilitators composed of live, virtual, and and enabling concepts. We have conducted three already, and plan constructive components. This environment works to meld exist-ing operational and strategic facets of the exercise with live forces, During the evolution of a prototype, four important activities creating a more robust and realistic exercise. The goal is to create occur. First, we conduct experimentation under field conditions. an environment where every level of training is conducted within Second, we get immediate feedback from users as to what works and the proper joint context. The JNTC mission incorporates service, what does not. Third, we use the prototype in multiple environments interagency, and multinational coalition partners. JNTC will achieve to ensure the final product will provide superior results in every cominitial operating capability by Fiscal Year 2004 (FY04) and final batant command area of responsibility. Finally, we prepare the protooperating capability by FY09.
type to become an institutionalized capability by incorporating it into JFCOM assists in promoting the transformation of our nation's doctrine, developing a training regimen, and making organizational or military, including its warfighting culture. This transformation will materiel adjustments. The currently approved prototypes are: emphasize a change from a force that focused on the deconfliction 0 Standing Joint Force HQ: a standing joint command and conof service capabilities, to a warfighting force that is coherently joint, trol element. collaboratively coordinated, effects-based, and network-centric.
0 Collaborative Information Environment: a tool and process A transformed force has coherent capabilities that are born and that provides common situational awareness, understanding, and fielded via a collaborative joint process. This requires that we work collaborative workspace for decisionmakers and staffs without with all who might have a stake in transforming our military, making today's time and space limitations. sure our collective efforts are focused and integrated.
0 Operational Net Assessment :a product, process, and organiTo fulfill this mission, we follow a deliberate methodology. First, zation all focused upon understanding the operational environment we receive guidance, principally in the form of the Chairman's Joint as well as the effects of friendly actions.
Experimentation Guidance. This guidance provides the focus of 0 Effects-Based Operations: a method of planning, preparing, and executing operations in which the focus is on achieving common our concept development and experimentation. Through collaboraeffects on adversaries. tion with other combatant commands, the services, the joint staff, Joint Interagency Coordination Group: an advisory element Office of the Secretary of Defense, and multinational partners, we on the commander's staff that facilitates information sharing and determine which wargames we should co-sponsor. JFCOM co-sponcoordinated action across the interagency community. sors approximately two service or combatant command wargames 0 Joint Fires Initiative : processes and tools that improve the every 6 months. These wargames help refine joint concepts, produce Joint Force's capability to apply fires from any force in support of any insights and implications for future experimentation, and guide other. investments in our military forces. Finally, on a semi-annual basis, 0 Joint Logistics (Common Relevant Operating Picture): a tool JFCOM will package recommendations for the Chairman, combatant that addresses the deployment, employment, and sustainment for a commanders, the Joint Chiefs, and other senior leaders. Their iteracoherently joint and multinational force. tive guidance and directives drive both paths of the joint concept There are several key advantages to accelerating the speed with development and experimentation campaign.
which prototypes reach the field. Delivering prototypes to the field Recommendations to improve joint force capabilities will be early provides combatant commanders with new capabilities that packaged in terms of the seven critical considerations: doctrine, are often more effective than what is currently in use. This practice organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilialso multiplies the locations of experimentation. Experimenting in ties. These Transformation Change Packages may also suggest what multiple locations provides us with multiple data points with which sort of changes must take place in terms of policy and culture to esort ofthangesnovationakeolaes integralmps r of poliy wand c re thk we can measure the value of new prototypes. As the accompanying list ensure that innovation becomes an integral part of the way we think illustrates, the joint prototype path improves warfighting, encourages about military operations. One point that we may never forget is that continuous experimentation, accelerates transformation, and incorpoour work has a vital impact on the military strength of our country.
rates feedback from combatant commanders and other partners. As such, any recommendations must be based on a reliable body of
We have made enormous strides in developing partnerships knowledge, if we expect senior leaders to trust the accuracy of our with groups that are committed to strengthening military capabilinformation and to act on each recommendation with confidence.
ity A look at the Standing Joint Force HQ prototype shows how the Coordination of this expansive partnership falls to a set of itn. proce is woing. service and combatant command general and flag officers, who patesiprcsiswkng JFCOM is committed to delivering the Standing Joint Force HQ regularly align activities. By encouraging a culture of collaboration, as a weapons system, completely integrated with its core concepts, creativity, and intelligent risk taking, JFCOM can help transform training strategy and programs, standards, manning plan, and supour military into a force that meets new and unexpected challenges, porting mater y stems.rogr a cs, t his gal, the a ch with a rich assortment of resources and innovative capabilities, porting materiel systems. To achieve this goal, the efforts of each service, as well as other stakeholders are coordinated, to make sure
The Joint Prototype Path that materiel components are integrated in a manner that enables us to deliver this capability on time. As this "weapon system" is estab-A prototype is an original type or form of an object that can be lished and refined, improvements are continuously introduced that evaluated in terms of its design, performance, and production potencome from operational experience or experimental activity. tial." Prototypes-models on which later stages of development are For a concept to complete its course on the prototype path, it based or judged-have inherent attributes that make them valuable must meet two conditions. First, it must show its value to the warftools in promoting and sustaining transformation. The process of ighter. Second, the concept must continue to improve incrementally prototyping is integral to military transformation because modeling as it is tested in the operational and exercise environments. Joint and experimentation are crucial to refining concepts and bringing Forces Command uses a set of standards, or metrics, to evaluate the ideas to physical form.
effectiveness of individual experiments we are conducting along the prototype path. These metrics measure our progress with experiinteragency, and multinational activities at the strategic, operational mentation, the value each prototype adds to our military capability, and tactical levels against any type of adversary-from conventional and the payoff and risk management associated with each product.
enemies to those who operate in the cusp between combatant and criminal; developing adaptive leaders and organizations.
Joint Concept Development Path and Future
Conducting and supporting distributed operations: planning, Capabilities preparing, and executing (deploy, fight, command and control, and sustain) simultaneously in multiple theaters and widely distributed While the joint prototype path focuses on improving current points of action within each theater-even if the theaters contain military capability, the joint concept development path helps us very immature infrastructures and when we must operate in a sigimprove future warfighting capabilities. To achieve these lonnificant antiaccess environment-while denying sanctuaries and ger-term improvements, we rely on an iterative experimentation protecting ourselves from homeland to point of action. program that is based on small, more frequent experiments. This
In collaboration with our partners, we further decomposed program represents a shift from our earlier practice of conductthese challenges into sets of joint issues. The joint concept developing fewer, more extensive experiments. Our concept development ment path, through a distributed partnering methodology, serves as wargames and experiments use common scenarios to examine the integrating process for exploring these issues. specific issues that relate to future and combined joint warfighting.
The Joint Operations Concepts and four Joint Operating ConBased on the observations, insights and implications generated by cepts, which include Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, these experiments, JFCOM makes recommendations to the ChairStrategic Deterrence, and Homeland Security together with an man, combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs, and other senior associated family of functional and enabling concepts is one of the leaders. These recommendations affect the development of future main outputs of concept development experimentation. We encourprograms, as well as the course of future experimentation, age innovation through the use of alternative approaches and the To improve joint concept experimentation effectiveness, we competition of ideas. The concept development and experimentause four common scenarios: tion program uses several joint approaches from the combatant commands and services as a means to ensure the JOpsC family of con-0 Major combat operations against an adversary with a global cepts include "best of breed" ideas. Concept development explores WMD threat and robust regional antiaccess capability, alternative concepts and does not rely on a "one point" solution that 0 Joint operations in an urban environment. may run the risk of single point of failure or leave the United States 0 Operations against a nonstate actor with significant regional susceptible to strategic surprise. The role of JFCOM is to work with those who have a stake in combat capability, access to weapons of mass effect (WME), and ties Thi roes o mbata t com n se and he artners to goba terorit oganiatins.this process--combatant commands, services, and other partners to global terrorist organizations.
-to make sure that experimentation along the joint concept devel-* Operations in a faltering or failing state that has regional WMD/ opment path remains anchored to operational requirements. We also WME capability.
want to be certain that this joint approach is truly a joint, collective These scenarios reflect current and future threats based on effort, not service-centric, because it is through collaboration that the geopolitical and military realities we see emerging between we can resolve the challenges facing our military with innovative now and 2020. This common set of scenarios encompasses most of solutions. JFCOM serves as a focal point for experimental activities the range of military operations and contains a variety of adversarthat occur along the joint concept development path. These activiies, from conventional enemies to adversaries who operate in the ties bring the services together using shared scenarios, modeling and cusp between military combat and criminal activity. They were simulation tools, analytical tools, and assessments. specifically developed to maintain consistency and correlation with A joint context is valuable for a number of key reasons. The defense planning scenarios, observe classification guidance, yet perjoint context ensures that a joint perspective informs the creative mit multinational participation in experimentation. Each scenario process right from the start and allows the co-evolution of service presents a range of military challenges, and we have evaluated those and joint concepts. This co-evolution ensures that joint capabilities challenges to determine which sets of issues call for more thorough are explored from the very beginning of the force development proexperimentation, cess. Capabilities that are meant to be fundamentally joint are best The approved scenarios are conditions in which we investigate conceived jointly. Takin a oint approach to problem solving also the major challenges that senior DOD leaders, the combatant comreduces the likelihood of duplicating our efforts and helps reduce mands, and the services have identified as the focus of Joint Concept the number of experiments. This approach also allows partners to Development: learn together throughout the process and can improve stability and Achieving decision superiority: generating and sustaining predictability in scheduling as we leverage events for mutual benefit. high-quality, shared situation understanding so that we can make
The joint approach encourages an interactive and iterative joint decisions and take actions-at the strategic, operational, and environment that integrates the right service, combatant command, tactical levels and within an interagency and multinational enviand multinational and government agency participation. ronment-faster than any adversary; proper decentralization in a This joint approach is best exemplified by how the combatant global, distributed, and fully networked environment, commands, the services, the joint staff, and JFCOM are collaboraCreating coherent effects (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and nontively developing the Joint Operations concepts as well as the family kinetic: harmonizing military (conventional and special operations), of subordinate Joint Operating, Functional, and Enabling Concepts. The overarching JOpsC describes how the Joint Force will operate in a complex environment within the next 15 to 20 years and describes non-DOD research we will provide a set of recommendations supthe coordinated development of service and combatant command ported by experimentation data. Senior leadership then provides capabilities: appropriate guidance on experimentation or investment.
0 Achieve common understanding of all dimensions of the battlespace throughout the joint force.
A Path to Transformation
This campaign plan is intended to provide the synergy described f Make joint decisions and take action throughout the joint by the Secretary's Transformation Planning Guidance to the broad force faster than the opponent.
area of Joint Concept Development and Experimentation. Success "* Adapt in scope, scale, and method as the situation requires.
of this campaign depends on creation of a collaborative environ-"* Rapidly deploy selected portions of the joint force that can ment among combatant commands, services, and multinational immediately transition to execution, even in the absence of develpartners. Together, we assess the results of experimentation, draw oped infrastructure.
insights and implications from those experiments, and develop and 0 Create and sustain continuous pressure throughout the batimplement recommendations for change. The recommendations will tlespace for as little or as long as it take to accomplish strategic or enable senior leaders to make decisions that determine the most operational aims.
effective way to allocate resources.
0 Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy any opponent The two-path strategy described in this campaign plan lies at with a combination of lethal and nonlethal means.
the heart of our approach to the transformation of military capabilities. Through a continuous process that integrates innovative * Conduct deployment and sustainment activities in support thinking, experimentation, and discovery, we help convert mature of multiple simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns.
concepts into prototypes. These prototypes, if they have value, ultimately make their way into the hands of combatant commanders n Accomplish all of the above in an inter-agency and multiwho use them to strengthen their warfighting capability. Ultimately, national context. the result will be to assist in moving the meaning of 'joint" from Joint Operating Concepts further develop key areas of the merely "deconflicting" the forces of each service to creating a coherJOpsC. Focusing at the operational-level, JOCs integrate functional ently joint force. and enabling concepts to describe how a Joint Force Commander JFCOM is one part of a large, DOD-wide effort to foster innovawill plan, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain a joint force given a tion. Prototyping, cosponsorship, alternative approaches, embedding specific operation or combination of operations. The JOCs will also experiments in exercises, and expanding the experimental ground provide a detailed conceptual perspective for joint experimentation all contribute to fostering that new, innovative culture. Millennium and assessment activities. Also developed collaboratively through Challenge 2002 started us on the track of innovation. JFCOM's this process, functional concepts utilize the JOCs to amplify a parexperimental activities over the past year have widened the track ticular military function, while enabling concepts, the most specific and accelerated our progress down-track significantly. Collaborative of concepts, are descriptions of how particular tasks or procedures efforts in the coming years will build on these successes. are performed within the context of broader functional areas. The This plan's measure of success is in generating real improveconcept development path creates a set of venues in which those ments in the military capability for warfighters, including our multiconcepts can be explored, examined, and refined. The venues are national partners. The intended outcome-a fundamentally joint, especially important because of the competition of ideas that results network-centric, distributed joint force capable of rapid decision from the variety of participants: services, combatant commands, superiority and massed effects across the battlespace-will undemultinational, and interagency experts. niably advance our defense strategy and, therefore, enhance the Senior leader participation is critical to creating a value-added freedom, peace, and security we seek as a nation. product from the concept development path. Senior leaders are directly involved in planning and in output. As we plan the activities within the concept development path, joint experimentation guidance, operational lessons learned, and other strategic directives shape the direction and content of the campaign plan and supporting events. As they did with prototyping activities, senior leaders approve the experiment focus for all concept development activities.
Notes and additional figures are available at: Immediately following major concept development events, we www'ndu. edu/ctnsp/defense-horizons report emerging or preliminary observations to senior representatives of the organizations involved and to other invited senior leaders. As an example, following Unified Quest 2003, a joint wargame in which all services and several combatant commands and agencies participated and was cosponsored by the Army and Joint Forces Command, key senior leaders from across the Department of Defense were present for discussions on the preliminary observaCetr fo rt P tions, insights, and lessons learned.
Hans Binnmndijk Approximately every 6 months, as we synthesize knowledge Director across major cosponsored events, service events, joint events, and
